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THE ANARCHIST IN THE COFFEE
HOUSE: A BRIEF CONSIDERATION OF
LOCAL CULTURE, THE FREE CULTURE
MOVEMENT, AND PROSPECTS FOR A
GLOBAL PUBLIC SPHERE
SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN*
The global network-of-networks that President George W. Bush calls “the
Internets” represents the first major communicative revolution since the
publication in 1962 of Jürgen Habermas’ influential historical work, The
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere.1 In that work Habermas
describes a moment in the social and political history of Europe in which a
rising bourgeoisie was able to gather in salons and cafes to discuss matters of
public concern. The public sphere represented a set of sites and conventions in
the eighteenth century in which (almost exclusively male) members of the
bourgeoisie could forge a third space to mediate between domestic concerns
and matters of state. It was a social phenomenon enabled by a communicative
revolution: the spread of literacy and the rise of cheap printing in Europe.
Habermas asserts that such a space did not exist in Europe in a strong form
before the eighteenth century and that by the end of the nineteenth century, it
quickly underwent some profound changes. The democratic revolutions in the
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1. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN
INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY, STUDIES IN CONTEMPORARY GERMAN
SOCIAL THOUGHT (1989). I use the word “revolution” cautiously. With only a twenty-year history, it is
far too early to assess the effects of the Internet in a balanced and sober manner. Hype and fear still
dominate the discussions of the effects of the Internet on culture, societies, politics, and economics. In
addition, the Internet hype may have distracted scholars from another revolution: the proliferation of
the magnetic cassette tape and player in the 1970s has had a more profound effect on daily life in all
corners of the Earth than the Internet has had so far. See PETER LAMARCHE MANUEL, CASSETTE
CULTURE: POPULAR MUSIC AND TECHNOLOGY IN NORTH INDIA (Philip Bohlman & Bruno Nettl
eds., 1993).
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United States and France, parliamentary reform efforts in England, and the
unsteady lurches toward republics in Germany and other parts of Europe
eventually codified many of the democratic aspirations of the public sphere:
openness, inclusiveness, and fairness. By the dawn of the twentieth century, the
corporatization of communications functions across nation-states had drained
the bourgeois public sphere of its deliberative potential and much of its
purpose. Habermas left those of us who worry about the health of democratic
practice with a nostalgic model of rational discourse with liberatory potential. It
has been a powerful and useful model. Since 1962 in Europe and 1989 in the
United States (the date of publication for the English translation of The
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere) Habermasian standards have
influenced media reform efforts and—to a much lesser extent—media policy.
Long tired of trying to rebuild the Hellenic Agora, we set about trying to build
a better coffee house.2
It is no surprise, then, that as soon as the Internet entered public
consciousness in the 1990s, cultural and communication theorists started asking
whether the Internet would enable the generation of a “global public sphere.”
Influenced perhaps too much by Marshall McLuhan’s model of a “global
village,” scholars, journalists, and activists drove Habermasian terms into
mainstream discussions of Internet policy and the potential of the Internet to
influence politics. Some theorists, like Mark Poster and Jodi Dean, are critical
of efforts to associate a print-centered nostalgic phenomenon with the
cacophony of cultural and political activities in global cyberspace.3 Others,
including Yochai Benkler and Howard Rheingold, see the practice of “peer
production” and the emergence of impressive and efficient organizational
practices as a sign that Habermas’ dream could come true in the form of digital
signals and democratic culture.4
This article examines one particular Public Sphere experiment—the rise of a
global “Free Culture Movement” that aims to limit the spread of strong
2. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (Thomas McCarthy ed., William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996)
(1992). This work extends and revises the work Habermas initiated in the 1960s, before he took his
“linguistic turn” into considerations of communicative competence in the 1970s. See JÜRGEN
HABERMAS, A THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1984)
(1981); Douglas Kellner, Habermas, the Public Sphere, and Democracy: A Critical Intervention,
available at http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/papers/habermas.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2005).
For critical perspectives on Habermas and public-sphere theory see HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC
SPHERE (Craig Calhoun ed., 1992); THE PHANTOM PUBLIC SPHERE (Bruce Robbins ed., 1993).
3. See Mark Poster, The Net as a Public Sphere?, WIRED, Nov. 1995, available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/3.11/poster.if_pr.html; Jodi Dean, Cybersalons and Civil Society:
Rethinking the Public Sphere in Transnational Technoculture, 13 PUBLIC CULTURE 243 (2001).
4. See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS (2006); see also MANUEL CASTELLS,
THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY (2d ed. 2000); HOWARD RHEINGOLD, SMART MOBS: THE
NEXT SOCIAL REVOLUTION (2002); HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY:
HOMESTEADING ON THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER (MIT Press 2000) (1993); Craig J. Calhoun,
Information Technology and the International Public Sphere, in SHAPING THE NETWORK SOCIETY:
THE NEW ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN CYBERSPACE 229 (2004), available at
http://www.ssrc.org/programs/calhoun/publications/IT_Int_Public_Sphere.pdf.
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intellectual property regimes. It also considers the complications encountered
by the Free Culture Movement when it crosses a very different value set at
work in global cultural policy debates—the protection of native or local culture
exemplified by the Native Culture Movement. Through this case study, I
suggest that perhaps the Public Sphere is not the best model to idealize when
we think globally and dream democratically. Habermas’s Public Sphere is as
temporally and geographically specific as Benedict Anderson’s notion of
“imagined communities” and similarly has been inflated to cover disparate
experiences that do not precisely map to the specific historical experience the
original work covers.5
Those behind the Free Culture Movement hope to deploy, leverage, and
spread liberal values into spaces that have been overrun by a proprietarian
ideology.6 Strong in the United States and Western Europe, and getting
stronger in Brazil, India, Australia, and other parts of the world, the Free
Culture Movement proponents hope to stifle efforts to extend patent protection
to computer software and the extension and expansion of copyright protection
over cultural works. Rhetorical weapons at work within the Free Culture
Movement include “commons talk,” a valorization of the un-owned elements of
cultural expression. Central to commons talk is the claim that a large and rich
“public domain” of published works can lower the cost of production and
increase the creative potential for the next generation of cultural producers.
The Free Culture Movement is Habermasian. It simulates and encourages
“public sphere” happenings around the world. And its early success is a
testament to the political potential of public sphere theory.7
The Native Culture Movement has very different goals. It has no use for the
public domain. In fact, the public domain is a problem for it. This movement
represents the interests of long-unrecognized culture groups, many of which
have struggled to assert and maintain identities under intense pressure from
illiberal, authoritarian, or totalitarian nation-states intent on eliding difference
for the sake of a forged and coerced postcolonial nationalism. Under these
conditions, many of these culture groups were not able to transmit local
traditions openly or teach languages to their young members. Since
liberalization and globalization replaced fervent postcolonial nationalism in

5. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND
SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (Verso 1991) (1983).
6. The proprietarian ideology is an expression of market fundamentalism claiming that if some
private ownership of culture and information is good, then more must be better.
7. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE
LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004); see also JAMES BOYLE,
SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION
SOCIETY (1996); PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS
THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? (New Press 2003) (2002); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS:
THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001); SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN,
COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HOW IT THREATENS
CREATIVITY (2001); Siva Vaidhyanathan, Remote Control: The Rise of Electronic Cultural Policy, 597
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 1 (2005).
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many places (and just as often in already-liberal states such as Australia and
Canada), these culture groups face a new threat: the corporate exploitation of
their signs, stories, and cultural practices. For them, a public domain is merely
an opportunity for others to cheapen their experiences, traditions, and beliefs
by rapid repetition and distribution in new and often insulting contexts.8
Both the Native Culture Movement and the Free Culture Movement stand
in opposition to “the torrent” of proprietary media images and texts that pour
out of multinational corporations via closed networks of satellite, cable,
broadcast, and retail outlets.9 In this opposition, both movements could find
common cause. One significant limitation to the prospects of a Free Culture–
Native Culture alliance, however, is the tone-deafness of much of the U.S.based rhetoric that serves as the foundation of the Free Culture Movement.
Habermas and John Stuart Mill do not always translate well.
Yet the tension between the very Habermasian Free Culture Movement and
the more communitarian Native Culture Movement reveals more than a
rhetorical fault in the Free Culture Movement. It exposes the frustrations and
limitations of efforts to generate a global public sphere that can wrestle with
any issue of global importance: cultural, trade- or health-related, or
environmental. First, it is not always clear what entity the global public sphere is
serving. The local (or national) public sphere in Habermas’s model mediates
between the private and the state. But there is rarely a clear state-like
supranational body that has effective sovereignty over any particular global
issue. Sometimes it might seem to be the World Trade Organization, but that
might just be a mask for the interests of a particular nation-state. Other times it
might seem to be UNESCO or the World Intellectual Property Organization.
But again, such organizations might just be acting as an instrument of policy
execution at the behest of a nation-state that demands the illusion of
multilateral cover for its will.
Second, public spheres imply, and perhaps require, real spaces for
deliberation and debate. The Free Culture Movement has proliferated not
merely through the use of e-mail lists and Websites; it has generated energy and
strategy through a long series of face-to-face meetings sponsored by
foundations, universities, and small groups of activists. These meetings might
have been organized through digital-information communication technologies,
but free culture activists still feel the need to meet face-to-face to forge

8. See ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES:
AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW, POST-CONTEMPORARY INTERVENTIONS (1998);
Rosemary J. Coombe & Andrew Herman, Rhetorical Virtues: Property, Speech, and the Commons on
the World Wide Web, 77 ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 559 (2004), available at http://wwwswiss.ai.mit.edu/6095/admin/admin-fall-2005/weeks/coombe_AQ.pdf; Robyn Kamira, Indigenous
Peoples: Inclusion in the World Summit for the Information Society, (World Summit on the
Information Summit 2002); Ian McDonald, Australian Copyright Council, UNESCO-WIPO World
Forum on the Protection of Folklore: Some Reflections and Reactions, 1997 COPYRIGHT REP. 1,
available at www.copyright.org.au/pdf/acc/articles_pdf/A97n21.pdf.
9. MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE? (2003).
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consensus and agendas for action. This privileges activists in wealthier places in
the world or those with institutional affiliation. Frequent fliers become agendasetters. The very marginality of the Native Culture Movement—its reason for
being—renders it peripheral to global discussions of cultural policy. Only when
represented by a friendly and supportive nation-state (again, Canada or
Australia) do Native Culture Movement members find their claims considered
by policymaking officials. But this is state-driven action. It is not done through
the public sphere.10
Although traditional public-sphere theory offers little to the Native Culture
Movement, civil society, more broadly conceived, offers more. That it does is
especially useful because so much Internet-mediated global political action is
markedly uncivil. The project should be to encourage civility among all parties
without hitching civility to the noxious ideology of “civilizing the uncivilized”
parts of the world. More often than not, American and European actors need to
be encouraged to behave civilly, whether they are corporations, states, or black
bloc anarchists disrupting a meeting of the G-8. On the margins, “Hactivism”
and cyber-vandalism have grown into important tools for the disaffected,
including members of the Native Culture Movement.11 The Internet does not in
itself provide the social space or norms Habermas describes and prescribes for a
healthy public sphere. It is not designed to be a force for civility. Paradoxically,
the Internet does a better job of stimulating (or simulating) rational spaces and
norms in illiberal contexts, such as when employed by democratic dissident
movements.12
To understand why uncivil behavior remains important in global politics, we
must consider the peculiar role of culture in the postmodern global-market
economy. Culture is contentious.13 On its face, this is a rather mundane claim.
But it is a historically important one. Seyla Benhabib argues that “culture”
traditionally has been considered central to the maintenance of worldviews of
dominant political structures, not a distinct field or locus of symbolic generation
and differentiation. The distinction of “culture” as a value outside the
regimentation and reification of science, politics, economics, or militarism is a
distinctly modern phenomenon, the result of a process that Max Weber called
“Wertausdifferenzierung” or “value differentiation.”14 Weber claimed that
culture in the modern state and capitalist economy tends to foster oppositional

10. McDonald, supra note 8, at 9–10.
11. Coombe & Herman, supra note 8, at 562–63.
12. SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, THE ANARCHIST IN THE LIBRARY: HOW THE CLASH BETWEEN
FREEDOM AND CONTROL IS HACKING THE REAL WORLD AND CRASHING THE SYSTEM (2004); see
also SHANTHI KALATHIL & TAYLOR C. BOAS, OPEN NETWORKS, CLOSED REGIMES: THE IMPACT OF
THE INTERNET ON AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES (2003).
13. THOMAS FRANK, WHAT’S THE MATTER WITH KANSAS?: HOW CONSERVATIVES WON THE
HEART OF AMERICA (2004).
14. See Seyla Benhabib, The Liberal Imagination and the Four Dogmas of Multiculturalism, 12
YALE J. CRITICISM 401, 401 (1999), for this translation.
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poses as much as legitimizing ones.15 Under the political canopy of the twentieth
century industrial and welfare state, cultural politics was merely adjunct to
questions of resource distribution. Calling for resource distribution in a
neoliberal context seems futile and is dismissed as counterproductive. In recent
years, Benhabib explains, cultural groups have been employing political
strategies in an effort to assert recognition rather than redistribution (although
there can be redistributive consequences of cultural recognition).16 In a
desperate, divided, Darwinian world economy, cultural recognition can seem as
important as life itself. Cultural humiliation can be considered cause for mass
slaughter.17
Attempts at forging a global public sphere discount the importance of
cultural recognition in favor of procedural equality—not that there is anything
wrong with that. But those who fail to consider the visceral power of specific
cultural claims are destined to exclude and alienate much of the postcolonial
world.

15. Id.
16. Id.
17. PETER L. BERGEN, HOLY WAR, INC.: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF OSAMA BIN LADEN
(2001).

